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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Petitioner/Appellant's ("Wife") 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
BY APPELLANT 
Wife has correctly stated the sole issue for appeal in this case, that is, whether 
or not the trial court's findings and conclusions support a finding of Wife's 
cohabitation terminating Husband's alimony obligation. However, pursuant to U. R. 
App. P. 24(b)(1) Respondent/Appellee ("Husband") supplements the standard of 
review of the cohabitation issue as follows. 
Wife is correct that whether or not an individual was "residing" with another for 
the purpose of determining cohabitation under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) is a mixed 
question of fact and law. See Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P. 2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) {citing Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985)). 
However, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings, Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P. 2d 908, 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(holding the 
weight of the evidence supported a cohabitation finding)1 and will defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact "unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous," and review 
1
 Other citations omitted. 
1 
the trial court's ultimate conclusion of law for correctness, Pendleton, 918 P. 2d at 
160.2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY 
OR REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
Applicable is the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9): 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2000). 
There are no other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations the interpretation of which is determinative or of central importance to the 
sole issue in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of The Case. Course of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
Husband agrees with Wife's statements as set forth in her Nature of the Case 
and Course of Proceedings. However, Husband supplements the Statement of Facts 
in Wife's brief for the purpose of rectifying her omissions, to make necessary 
corrections and modifications and to provide the factual bases for the trial court's 
ruling and direction on remand. To the extent Husband disputes Wife's statement of 
facts he has supplemented the same below. 
2
 Husband acknowledge's the trial court retains discretion in deciding divorce cases, as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. However, Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871, 872-73 (Utah 1979), cited by Wife, 
is a case involving property settlement incident to divorce, not cohabitation. See id. at 871. 
2 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Husband and Wife, married on December 26, 1986 in Weber County, 
Ogden, State of Utah . R. 17. 
2. The parties were granted a divorce on or about October 13,1998. R. 413. 
Facts Related to Wife's Cohabitation With Mitchell Adams. 
3. During her marriage Wife met Mitchell Adams ("Mr. Adams")at a 
seminar in Denver, Colorado, in approximately March or 1997. R. 515: 70 (vol. I); 
R. 515: 3-4 (vol. II). 
4. During that first seminar which lasted four or five days, Wife and 
Mitchell Adams became intimate and had sexual intercourse. R. 515: 4-5 (vol. II). 
5. Wife and Mr. Adams spoke by telephone and corresponded via e-mail. 
R. 515: 5-6 (vol. II). 
6. In April of 1997, Wife and Mr. Adams met at another seminar, where 
they spent two or three days in St. Augustine, Florida, and one day, the day of the 
seminar, in Orlando, Florida. The couple met because they wanted to see each other 
and because they were staffing a one-day seminar in Orlando. During both their stay 
in St. Augustine and in Orlando, they shared a hotel room, and had sexual contact and 
intercourse R. 515: 6-8, 39 (vol. II). 
7. After the meetings in Florida during April of 1997, Wife and Mr. Adams 
maintained contact through the telephone and via e-mail. R. 515: 8 (vol. II). 
8. Wife and Mr. Adams next met in California over the Memorial Day 
3 
weekend of 1997. Wife took her daughter Aarika to a Tony Robbins seminar in 
Anaheim, California. Wife and Mr. Adams met face-to-face and had sexual relations 
and intercourse. Although the seminar was for four or five days, Wife and Mr. Adams 
saw each other only the first day and night as Husband thereafter arrived in Anaheim. 
R. 515: 8-10 (vol. II). 
9. Following their meeting in California, Wife and Mr. Adams continued 
their relationship and communicated with each other by telephone and e-mail, until 
Wife decided to try and work on her relationship with Husband. Wife did not contact 
Mr. Adams after that time until New Year's Eve 1997 or New Year's Day 1998, when 
she initiated contact with Mr. Adams and decided to continue the relationship that 
began in 1997. R. 515: 10-11 (vol. II). 
10. In approximately April 199 8 Mr. Adams flew from his home in Deltona, 
Florida to Utah to see Wife, and spent approximately four or five days in Sherwood 
Hills near Logan and in Ogden. During his stay in Utah, Mr. Adams saw Wife every 
day and they had sexual contact and engaged in intercourse every day. R. 515:12-15 
(vol. II). 
11. Mr. Adams again returned to Utah in May 1998 to see Wife. He 
remained in Utah for four or five days staying at a hotel in Brigham City where he saw 
Wife daily and they daily engaged in sexual intercourse. Mr. Adams considered the 
couple's status as "dating and working on furthering our relationship when she got 
divorced." The couple may have discussed, but made no concrete plan at that time, 
to get married. R. 515: 15-17 (vol. II). 
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12. Mr. Adams next trip to Utah to see Wife occurred in late June or early 
July of 1998. He remained in Utah for an extended period of time, two or three 
months through August 1998. He stayed at a hotel and saw Wife at the hotel and at 
her home on Park Drive in Mantua, Utah. The couple saw each other daily or every 
other day and engaged in sexual contact and intercourse. During this extended stay 
in Utah, Mr. Adams returned to his home in Florida on a couple of occasions, once to 
take care of business, and the other to take Wife's son Derrick Dibble to Florida and 
enroll him in school before the school year commenced. Wife allowed Mr. Adams to 
take Derrick to his home in Florida, where Derrick began residing, and enroll him in 
school. R. 515: 17-23, 50,146 (vol. II). 
13. The couple became engaged on or about July 11, 1998, before Wife's 
divorce was final. When Mr. Adams proposed, he gave her an engagement ring and 
Wife accepted the marriage proposal. R. 515: 19 (vol. II) 
14. On or about September 18,1998 Wife and five of her children, Derrick 
Dibble, Aarika Dibble, Dax Dibble, Aalexis Dibble, Damien Dibble, and Aarika's 
boyfriend Matt Zerkle moved from the State of Utah to Florida where Mr. Adams 
lived and resided with him at his home at 642 Fort Smith Boulevard, Deltona, Florida, 
22738. R. 515: 72-3, 91 (vol. I); R. 515: 3,144 (vol. II). Wife intended at the time 
she and the children moved to Florida with Mr. Adams that they would be residing in 
Deltona on a permanent basis. R. 515: 87 (vol. I). Husband understood that Wife 
intended to reside permanently in Florida. R. 515: 129 (vol. I). Husband's 
5 
understanding arose in part from his knowledge of Wife's and Mr. Adams' 
relationship over the previous two years. R. 515: 193 (vol. I). 
15. Wife rented two U-haul trucks, packed all of her belongings and the 
children's belongings and moved to Florida leaving no other residence anywhere and 
intending to reside in Florida and to marry Mr. Adams. R. 515: 23-24, (vol. II) 
16. At the time of the move all of the parties children were of school age. R. 
515: 73 (vol. I). Wife withdrew the children from school in the State of Utah and 
enrolled them in elementary or high school as appropriate, in Florida. R. 515: 73-5 
(vol. I). When she later moved back to the State of Utah, Wife withdrew the children 
from school in Florida and registered them in school in Utah. R. 515: 78 (vol. I). 
17. When Wife and her children arrived in Florida they all resided with Mr. 
Adams at his home, and further resided with Mr. Adams continuously from the day 
they arrived in Florida until the day the left and moved back to Utah on Thanksgiving 
Day 1998. R. 515: 74-5, 78 (vol. I); R. 515: 24 (vol. II). 
18. During his testimony, Wife's witness, her son Derrick Dibble testified he 
considered Mr. Adams' home his home. R. 515: 150 (vol. II). 
19. During the time Wife and her children lived with Mr. Adams they kept 
clothing and a few personal items in the house, including a mattress, a photo album, 
and other necessaries, R. 515: 76, 78-9 (vol. I); R. 515: 28 (vol. II), but kept the 
majority of their belongings in the garage at Mr. Adams' residence, R. 515:54-5 (vol. 
II), and in the U-hauls parked in front on Mr. Adams' residence until the U-haul 
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company repossessed the U-haul trucks. Wife then rented a storage unit in Florida 
where she stored the remainder of their belongings. R. 515: 135-36 (vol. II). 
20. Wife and her children had a key to Mr. Adams' home, R. 515: 25 (vol. 
II),and were free to come and go from his home without restriction. R. 515:76-7 (vol. 
I); R. 515: 25 (vol. II). 
21. Wife purchased groceries while living at Mr. Adams residence for 
herself, the kids, R. 515: 77,81 (vol. I); R. 515: 55-6 (vol. II), and Wife, the children, 
and Mr. Adams would eat dinner together at the home when everyone was home for 
dinner at the same time. R. 515: 89 (vol. I); R. 515: 55-6 (vol. II). 
22. Wife and the children enjoyed unrestricted and free access to the 
telephone in the Adams home. R. 515: 77 (vol. I); R. 515:27 (vol. II). Wife gave Mr. 
Adams' phone number out to various people to contact her and the children in Florida 
and in fact she gave Husband Mr. Adams' number to contact the children. R. 515: 78 
(vol. I). Mr. Adams did request that either the children or Husband cover the costs 
associated with the children's long distance phone calls to their father. R. 515: 143-
44, 146 (vol. II). 
23. Wife received mail at Mr. Adams' post office box, as did the children. 
R 515:27,56-7 (vol. II). Wife also obtained another post office box. R. 515:78 (vol. 
I)-
24. Although Wife slept on one of the mattresses with her young children in 
a room separate from that of Mr. Adams, R. 515:79 (vol. I), she and Mr. Adams had 
sexual relations and intercourse on almost a daily basis while she was living with him 
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in Florida. R. 515: 24-5 (vol. II). Wife also testified that she would not be inclined 
to have slept with Mr. Adams with children in the house. R. 515: 93 (vol. I). 
25. Wife, her children and Mr. Adams attended church together a couple of 
times while Wife was residing in Florida. R. 515: 79 (vol. I). 
26. Wife purchased an automobile when she arrived in Florida which she 
parked in front of the Adams home, a Volkswagen Fox, R. 515: 80 (vol. I); R. 515: 
26 (vol. II), and Mr. Adams purchased a Volkswagen Bug for Wife's child Derrick to 
drive while he was in Florida. R. 515:25-7 (vol. II). When Wife moved back to Utah 
she agreed to purchase the Bug from Mr. Adams, but remitted only partial payment 
to him for the automobile. R. 515: 578 (vol. II). 
27. Wife and Mr. Adams intended that Wife would move to Florida with the 
children, the couple would get married and live together in a home Mr. Adams was to 
purchase. R. 515: 59 (vol. II). Pursuant to this agreement, Mr. Adams took steps to 
purchase a martial residence for the family, the 1730 Lorraine Drive home. Wife and 
four of her children were going to live in the Lorraine Drive home, and Derrick Dibble 
and Mr. Adams were going to live in Mr. Adams' current residence until the couple 
were formerly married. The family intended to live in the marital/family residence 
together after that time. Mr. Adams was unable to purchase the home, however, 
because of problems associated with the closing. R. 515:59-60 (vol. II). Because the 
home was not purchased, the couple and her children simply lived in the home Mr. 
Adams already owned. R. 515: 28-9, 52-3 (vol. II). 
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28. Mr. Adams did not request Wife to pay rent, utilities, or any other costs 
associated with the residence, nor did he anticipate she would pay any costs associated 
with the Lorraine Drive home. He intended to support the family as a husband would. 
R. 515: 29, 54-5 (vol. II). 
29. Wife, Mr. Adams and the children participated in family-oriented 
activities while they were all living in the same house together in Florida. They went 
to movies, the amusement parks, Busch Gardens and Sea World, and Mr. Adams 
occasionally assisted the children with their homework. R. 515: 29-30 (vol. II). 
30. Even before Wife moved to Florida with her children, she and Mr. Adams 
engaged in family-oriented activities. Mr. Adams flew to Utah on one occasion to 
attend the L.D.S. missionary farewell of one of Wife's children, Dustin Dibble. R. 
515: 48 (vol. II). 
Wife's Testimony Related to Cohabitation. 
31. Wife testified at trial that she and Mr. Adams were only friends. R. 515: 
71 (vol. I). 
32. Wife testified her relationship with Mr. Adams did not change from that 
of just friends until July or August of 1998 when the couple became engaged. R. 515: 
71, 102 (vol. I). 
33. Wife claimed the children had a residence address in Florida of 1730 
Lorraine Drive. R. 515: 76 (vol. I). However, as stated in the Record, supra, no one, 
not the children, not Wife, not Mr. Adams, ever resided at Lorraine Drive during the 
time Wife moved to Florida in September 1998 until Thanksgiving Day 1998 when 
9 
she moved back to the State of Utah. Wife, the parties' children, and Mr. Adams all 
lived together continuously at Mr. Adams' residence during the relevant time frame. 
R. 515: 76 (vol. I). 
34. Wife claimed she did not have a key to Mr. Adams' home, but that she 
and her children were never denied access to the home and came and went as they 
pleased. R. 515: 76-7 (vol. I). 
35. Wife testified she had no mailing address at the residence but that she 
purchased and received mail at her own post office box. R. 515: 78 (vol. I). 
36. Wife testified that she and Mr. Adams had no sexual contact or 
intercourse whatsoever during the period of time she was engaged to Mr. Adams and 
residing with him in Florida. R. 515:79-80 (vol. I). Wife further testified that she and 
Mr. Adams had no physical contact during the time she lived in Florida in his home. 
No kissing, petting, hand holding, or anything else. R. 515: 83 (vol. I). However, 
Wife's witness and son, Derrick Dibble testified on cross-examination, 
Q. In connection with the - a couple of questions toward the end that you 
were asked by counsel, you observed your mother and Mr. Adams, as I understood 
your testimony, holding hands and hugging, that sort of thing? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Did you ever observe them kissing each other? 
A. I'm sure I did. 
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Q. There would be, of course, no way that you would know whether or not 
the two of them were engaged in any sort of sexual relations outside of your presence, 
you wouldn't have any idea about that? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. All right. You were aware, as I understand it, that your mother and Mr. 
Adams were in fact engaged to be married at a point in time, you knew that, didn't 
you? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. You knew that when you left Utah to move to Florida, at least the two of 
those folks, your mom and Mr. Adams, anticipated a home that would be there, in 
terms of size, to accommodate, if I can use that term, the new family? 
[objection overruled] 
Q. You were aware of the fact that this new home that was to be made 
available in Florida was for the kids and your mom and Mr. Adams when they got 
married, weren't you? 
A. When they got married, yes. 
* * * * 
Q. Were you aware that your mother and Mr. Adams were going to get 
married at the time you left and moved to Florida? 
A. She had a ring on her finger, but I never really talked to her about it. 
* * * * 
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Q. And were you required, in enrolling [in school in Florida], to give an 
address of where you resided to the people at the school? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you give them the address of Mr. Adams's residence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That would be the place where you were living? 
A. Uh-huh. 
R. 515: 139-40,141-43 (vol. II). 
37. Wife stated she spent no time in Mr. Adams' bedroom doing anything 
other than talking, and that the only reason they talked in the bedroom is because it 
was quieter than other rooms in the house. R. 515: 83-4 (vol. I). Yet, on re-direct 
examination by Wife's counsel, Wife's son Derrick Dibble testified: 
Q. Did you ever observe anything that would cause you to believe that your 
mother was having a sexual relationship with Mr. Adams while in that house? 
A. Umm, I pretty much stayed out of it. I didn't want to think about things 
like that. 
Q. You didn't see anything, you don't know one way or the other? 
A. I didn't really think about it. 
R. 515: 145-46 (vol. II). 
38. On cross-examination Wife testified she never intended to live with 
Mitchell Adams in a "husband and wife situation," R. 515:90 (vol. I), despite the fact 
that she and Mr. Adams were engaged at the time she and the children moved to 
12 
Florida. R. 515: 20 (vol. II). Wife claimed she moved to Florida with the intent, 
among other things, to get to know Mr. Adams and had not yet determined whether 
she would marry Mr. Adams. R. 515: 91 (vol. I), and then later testified: 
Q. And why was [the engagement] broken off [approximately one to two 
weeks after the couple became engaged]? 
A. Because I didn't want to marry him. 
Q. And was that just because you got to know him better or some other 
reason? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. So when you went to Florida you had no intention of marrying 
[Mr. Adams] then? 
A. No. 
R. 515: 103-04 (vol. I). And then on further redirect by Husband's counsel: 
Q. You moved you and your children from the state of Utah to Florida 
without any expectation of having a permanent relationship with Mr. Adams, is that 
your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
R. 515: 106 (vol. I). 
39. Wife testified that she did not intend to reside with Mr. Adams if they 
were not husband and wife, R. 515: 90 (vol. I), and then not thirty seconds later 
testified on cross-examination by her counsel as follows: 
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Q. Did you anticipate that if you got a house you would rent that [Mr. 
Adams] would have resided in that home or had you thought that far ahead? 
A. Umm, I planned on him being with us. 
R. 515: 92 (vol. I). Wife then further testified on cross-examination by her counsel: 
Q. As of November the 26th what was your reason for moving back to Utah? 
A. Because I didn't have any place to live. I couldn't rent any place, I 
couldn't find a house to rent. 
Q. And you did not want to live in Mr. Adams's home anymore? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because I never intended to live with him in the first place. 
R. 515: 93 (vol. I). 
40. Wife claimed she and Mr. Adams were no longer engaged when she 
moved to Florida in September 1998. R. 515: 103 (vol. I). 
41. After Mr. Adams and Derrick Dibble's testimony regarding Wife and 
Mr. Adams' common residency and sexual contact, the trial court broke for recess and 
upon return Wife's counsel called her to the witness stand where, for the first time, 
Wife claimed the reason she ended the relationship with Mr. Adams was because of 
mental and physical abuse while she was living with him in Florida. Wife also 
changed her story and testified that she found a place to live in Utah when she came 
with the children to Utah in October 1998 for Husband's wedding. R. 515: 168-90 
(vol. II). 
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42. Wife's counsel did not ask Jaylynn Cobbley, Wife's best friend and 
confidant one question about whether Mr. Adams physically abused Wife while she 
was residing in Florida. R. 515:223-41 (vol. I); R. 515: 71-80 (vol. II). In fact when 
Wife's counsel asked Ms. Cobbley if Wife told her why she was "afraid" of Mr. 
Adams, Ms. Cobbley responded, "No. Just that he was very strange." R. 515:74 (vol. 
II). 
43. When asked about her observation of the general atmosphere in the house 
and her mother and Mr. Adams' relationship, Wife's daughter and witness Aarika 
Storey testified only that if Mr. Adams was in a bad mood everyone stayed away from 
him, and that he "seemed to be a lot different than what he turned out to be." She 
further testified, 
Q. What did you notice about him to cause you to draw that conclusion? 
A. He just was really ornery. He didn't really seem to want to be bothered 
and so everybody just kind of stayed away from him. 
Q. Did you see that same type of demeanor towards your mother? 
A. Yeah. She pretty much stayed away from him too. 
R. 515: 157-58 (vol. II). 
Mr. Adams' Testimony on Cohabitation. 
44. Mr. Adams testified that the couple remained engaged even after Wife 
moved from his home and returned to the state of Utah. He testified that for Christmas 
1998 he presented Wife with a necklace for Christmas, that he visited her and the 
15 
children in Utah in December 1998 and the couple did not break off their engagement 
until December 1998 or January 1999. R. 515: 20-1, 58 (vol. II). 
45. Wife's counsel cross-examined Mr. Adams with the stated intent of 
impeaching his testimony and challenging his truthfulness and credibility. R. 515:36 
(vol. II). Wife's counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Adams, however, did nothing 
more than reinforce the credibility of his testimony and the incredibility of Wife's 
testimony as set forth above. R. 515: 31-58 (vol. II). 
The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions on Wife's Cohabitation. 
46. The trial court explained during trial that if Mr. Adams' testimony were 
to be believed, that Wife cohabited after the time the divorce decree was entered on 
or about October 13, 1998. R. 515: 44 (vol. II). 
47. The trial court, weighing the testimony of the parties and all witnesses 
found Wife's testimony regarding her relationship with Mr. Adams and her living 
arrangements and intentions related thereto, while in Florida, to be incredible. The 
itrial court accepted, as more credible, the testimony of Mr. Adams. Transcript of 
Videotape March 22, 2001, pp. 3-4. 
48. The trial court found that Wife met Mitchell Adams ("Mr. Adams") at a 
seminar in Colorado on or about March, 1997, attended by Wife and Mr. Adams. The 
trial court further found that they commenced a sexual relationship and had sexual 
intercourse at that time. Findings of Fact, 12; R. 490. 
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49. The trial court found that thereafter Wife and Mr. Adams had several 
communications by telephone and e-mail and that they met each other face-to-face 
over the next several months in Colorado, California, Florida and Utah. The trial court 
found that during each of these occasions the parties engaged in intimate relations and 
had sexual intercourse. Findings of Fact, Tf 3; R. 490. 
50. The trial court found that during the summer of 1998, Mr. Adams 
traveled to the State of Utah where he conducted some business but his purpose was 
also to visit with Wife, which the trial court found he did. The visitations included 
meetings between Mr. Adams and Wife at hotels in Ogden, Brigham City and Wife's 
residence in Mantaway, Utah. The trial court further found that during each of these 
visits Wife and Mr. Adams were intimate with each other and engaged in sexual 
intercourse. Findings of Fact, ^ 4; R. 491. 
51. The trial court found that during the late summer of 1998, Wife and Mr. 
Adams became engaged and Mr. Adams gave Wife an engagement ring which, at the 
date of trial, had not been returned to Mr. Adams, although the trial court found that 
in the fall of 1998, while in Florida, Wife tendered the ring to Mr. Adams but that the 
ring was subsequently returned to Wife. Additionally, the Court finds that for the 
1998 Christmas holiday, Mr. Adams gave Wife a necklace which is still in her 
possession. Findings of Fact, f 5; R. 491. 
52. The trial court found that Wife made a determination in the early fall of 
1998 to move with her children to the State of Florida. The trial court found that while 
Wife's residence location and that of her children, together with the boyfriend of one 
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of Wife's children, was disputed, the trial court found by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Adams decided to acquire a larger residence than the one in which 
he was residing in Deltona, Florida, at the time of Wife's move to accommodate Mr. 
Adams, Wife and her children. The trial court found that by reason of some financing 
difficulties, the larger residence was not purchased, but that Wife with her family and 
a boyfriend of one of her children, moved into Mr. Adams' residence and resided there 
as their sole residence from mid-September, 1998 to the Thanksgiving holiday of 1998 
when Wife and her children moved back to the State of Utah. The trial court further 
found that during this period of time Wife had no other residence anywhere. Findings 
of Fact,] 6; R. 491-92. 
5 3. The trial court found that during Wife' s residence in the State of Florida, 
Husband paid Wife the full amount of alimony and child support due her i.e., 
$3,500.00 per month alimony and $3,000.00 per month child support. The trial court 
further found that the Decree of Divorce entered in this case in specific detail, sets 
forth the clear agreement of the parties that travel to and from the State of Florida by 
the parties' children and in certain circumstances, Wife, was treated and addressed and 
that travel in fact occurred for which deductions from alimony by Husband as 
authorized by the Decree of Divorce were made. Findings of Fact, \ 7; R. 492. 
54. The trial court found that while in the State of Florida, the following facts 
were established by a fair preponderance of the evidence: 
a. That the only residence of Wife and her children was the residence 
of Mr. Adams at 642 Fort Smith Blvd., Deltona, Florida 32738. 
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b. That Mr. Adams provided Wife with a key to his residence which 
was freely accessible by her and her children without any permission being required 
of or from Mr. Adams. 
c. That Wife did not contribute to the payment of any indebtedness 
against the Adams residence, utilities at the Adams residence, nor was she restricted 
in any way from using Mr. Adams' telephone at his residence and that she did so 
without charge. The trial court found that Wife's children likewise had free and 
unrestricted access to the Adams' residence without the payment of any consideration 
and used utilities, including the telephone, although Mr. Adams did request that the 
children pay for any long distance telephone calls. 
d. That Wife parked moving trucks at the residence of Mr. Adams 
which contained various personal property, furniture, etc.,- until such vehicles were 
impounded by the moving truck rental company, and further that such items were later 
placed in storage by Wife until such property was subsequently removed and returned 
to the State of Utah. The Court finds in addition that Wife, Wife's children and the 
children's friend kept personal effects, and certain items of furniture, including a 
mattress at Mr. Adams' residence during the period of time Wife and her children 
were residents at Mr. Adams' address. 
e. That Wife cooked meals at the Adams residence and that on 
occasion they ate together with Wife's family and further that from time to time Mr. 
Adams, the Wife and Wife's family, engaged in recreational activities of various 
kinds. 
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f. That Wife enrolled her children in school in Florida and that the 
children in fact attended school there and further that from time to time, Mr. Adams 
and the Wife assisted Wife's children with homework and school assignments. 
g. That Wife and her children had sleeping arrangements whereby 
one male child and a male friend slept in one bedroom at the Adams residence; that 
the children and Wife slept on mattresses and/or a couch in the living and/or dining 
room, and that one female child slept on a couch. 
h. That while the children did not observe any sexual intimacy 
between Mr. Adams and Wife, at least one of the parties' children did observe hand 
holding, kissing and other evidence of affection between Mr. Adams and Wife. 
i. That during the period of Wife' s residency in the Adams residence 
in the State of Florida, Mr. Adams and Wife engaged in considerable sexual 
intercourse and were otherwise intimate with each other. 
j . That Wife received mail at both her own post office box and 
through Mr. Adams' post office box which mail included credit card billings, 
advertisements, correspondence from Husband to the children, and other 
correspondence. 
k. That Wife and her family attended church services while in Florida 
and on occasion were accompanied by Mr. Adams. 
1. That while Wife and Mr. Adams planned marriage, their plans did 
not materialize and their relationship terminated when Wife and her family returned 
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to the State of Utah at or following Thanksgiving, 1998. Findings of Fact, \ 8; R. 493-95. 
55. That U.C.A. § 30-3-5 as well as paragraph 18 of the Decree entered in 
this case provides for the termination of alimony in the event of Wife's cohabitation. 
Conclusions of Law, 12; R. 499. 
56. That Wife did cohabitate with Mr. Adams in the State of Florida from 
October 1, 1998 through the Thanksgiving holiday, 1998 and as such, all alimony 
terminated as provided by law on October 1,1998. Conclusions of Law, \ 3; R. 499. 
57. That the trial court granted Husband's Petition to Modify as to alimony. 
Conclusions of Law, f 4; R. 499. 
58. That due to Wife' s cohabitation with Mr. Adams, Husband is entitled to 
and was awarded a judgment against Wife for alimony paid to her from November 1, 
1998 through October, 2000, in the sum of $67,854.00. Conclusions of Law, \ 5; R. 
499. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In approximately March of 1997 Wife and Mr. Adams became acquainted at a 
seminar in Denver, Colorado. See Statement of Facts, f 3. (hereinafter "SOF'). These 
two individuals became intimately involved, engaging in sexual relations and 
intercourse and continued to meet and develop their relationship, both emotionally and 
physically on many occasions thereafter. See SOF, ^f 3-13. 
Husband and Wife were divorced on or about October 13,1998. See SOF, 12. 
Beginning in 1997 and continuing through the end of 1998, Wife and Mr. Adams 
continued to develop their relationship. See SOF, fflj 3-14. In fact, Mr. Adams flew 
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to Utah on one occasion to attend the L.D.S. missionary farewell of one of Wife's 
children. See SOF, 130. Mr. Adams also came to Utah and stayed for an extended 
period of time in the summer of 1998. See SOF, 1 12. Wife and Mr. Adams became 
engaged on July 11,1998, in Salt Lake City, and Mr. Adams thereafter began to assist 
Wife to make and complete the move to Florida with her children. See SOF, H 13-15. 
Mr. Adams even went to Florida with one of Wife's children, Derrick Dibble, prior 
to the commencement of the fall school term and enrolled him in school. See SOF, 
112. 
Mr. Adams then flew back to Utah and in approximately September of 1998, 
Wife, Mr. Adams, Wife's daughter Aarika and Aarika's boyfriend Matt Zerkle, drove 
two separate U-haul trucks with all of Wife and her children's belongings in them, to 
Florida, where she intended to live. See SOF, H 14-15.3 Wife maintained no 
residence in Utah or anywhere other than Florida for that matter. See SOF, 115. 
When Wife arrived in Florida, she and her five children commenced their residence 
with Mr. Adams in the Adams home. See SOF, H 17-18. If she did not reside in 
Florida at Mr. Adams' residence in Deltona, where did she reside? Not only is the 
Record clear, she could not assert any other plausible, believable or even fabricated 
answer. That is simply because there was none. Mr. Adams gave Wife a key to his 
home, and supported Wife and the children's family expenses including the mortgage 
and utilities. See SOF, H 20,28. In turn, Wife supplied some groceries for the family 
3
 It appears from a review of the record that Wife's other children arrived in Florida by airplane. 
R. 515: 23 (vol. II). 
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and cooked meals for the family at Mr. Adams' home. See SOF, ^  21. The family had 
unrestricted access to the home, and in fact received mail at Mr. Adams' post office 
box in Florida. See SOF, fflf 22-23. Throughout this period of time Wife and Mr. 
Adams continuously engaged in intimate relations, including sexual intercourse. See 
SOF,^ 24. 
Mr. Adams encountered problems related to the closing of the home he was in 
the process of purchasing for the family to live in after he and Wife were married. See 
SOF, | 27. Although Wife claims she and her children intended to live in the home 
separate from Mr. Adams until the marriage, it is clear Wife and Mr. Adams were 
embarking on a life together as a couple and as a family which included her five 
children. See SOF, 127. Wife, Mr. Adams, and the children participated in activities 
that families normally participate in, including movies, eating dinner together, 
attending church, and participating in recreational pursuits. See SOF, ffl[ 25, 29-30. 
Wife and Mr. Adams' relationship began to deteriorate in November 1998, and 
on Thanksgiving Day 1998 Wife and the children returned to the State of Utah. See 
SOF, 117. Wife withdrew her children from school in Florida, returned to the State 
of Utah, enrolled them in school in Utah and leased a home. See SOF, 116. Even at 
this time Wife continued her relationship with Mr. Adams, she did not return the 
engagement ring he gave her when she accepted his marriage proposal, and the trial 
court found Mr. Adams' testimony believable and credible, including the fact that 
Wife and Mr. Adams' relationship did not end until December 1998 or January 1999. 
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See SOF, fflf 44,47. In fact, Mr. Adams flew to Utah in December 1998 to see Wife 
and her children and gave Wife a necklace as a Christmas gift. See SOF, ^ 44. 
Wife cohabited with her then fiance, Mr. Adams, while living in the State of 
Florida from at least September 1998 - November 1998. See SOF, 156. Wife moved 
to the State of Florida with the intent and expectation that they would live together as 
a married couple, with her children, in a marital household. In light of the 
overwhelming testimony presented establishing Wife and Mr. Adams' continuing 
relationship, their common residency, and sexual contact while living together, the 
trial court correctly determined Wife cohabited within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(9) and relevant Utah case law. The trial court had no option under the 
evidence presented other than to terminate Husband's alimony obligation as of 
November 1998. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WIFE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Wife's appellate brief falls light years short of meeting her burden and oft 
repeated duty and obligation to marshal the evidence. Accordingly, under well-settled 
Utah law, this Court must conclude that the Record supports the trial court's findings, 
conclusions and ultimate decision. 
Wife's failure to marshal the evidence is fatal to her appeal, even without an 
examination of the overwhelming evidence in support of the trial court's findings, 
conclusions and Ruling. Continuing a relationship that began in 1997, Wife cohabited 
with Mr. Adams in the State of Florida from approximately September 1998 through 
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November 1998, thus terminating Husband's alimony obligation and resulting in the 
overpayment of alimony by Husband to Wife. 
A critical and fundamental requirement when challenging a trial court's findings 
of fact is to marshal the evidence supporting those findings. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 
UT App 12, f 24. There, this Court reiterated, 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and 
fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the 
duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of 
this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Id. (citations omitted). An appellant who merely reargues her position on appeal fails 
to meet her duty and burden. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P. 2d 598, 603 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). An appellant similarly fails to marshal the evidence on appeal 
when she merely recites the findings on point and highlights the evidence she deems 
contrary to the findings. See Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P. 2d 508,516 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996); see also Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P. 2d 603, 606 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In the case subjudice, Wife does not assume the role of devil's advocate, but 
chooses instead to suggest to this Court each of the reasons she believes the trial court 
made an erroneous decision. Wife's inability to extricate herself from her own shoes 
and marshal the evidence as mandated in decision after decision of this Court, serves 
no purpose other than to rehash Wife' s testimony which the trial court, justifiably and 
correctly, found totally incredible. 
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Wife has not presented in "comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [she] 
resists[,]" rather Wife fails in certain instances to even recite the findings as they apply 
to cohabitation. Wife utterly fails to point in the Record to the avalanche of evidence 
in support of the trial court's well-reasoned findings and conclusion that Wife engaged 
in cohabitation without ceremonial marriage and as such, Husband's alimony 
obligation ceased. 
On the issue of cohabitation Wife merely regurgitates the reasons the trial court 
found she and Mr. Adams cohabited in Florida, and pays short shrift, at best, to the 
evidence supporting the trial court's determination. See generally Brief of Appellant 
(hereinafter "Wife's Brief). Wife's brief is bereft of the overwhelming evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and conclusion on cohabitation. In truth and in 
fact, the trial court made detailed findings on the issue of cohabitation and Wife 
presented to no evidence to the contrary to overcome the preponderance of the 
evidentiary burden met by Husband. See SOF, fflf 48-58. The reason for her failure 
is obvious, she cannot overcome the only conclusion demanded by the evidence, that 
is that she chose to cohabit with Mr. Adams and her marshaling of the evidence would 
support no other conclusion. 
Wife's attempt to align her position with that of cases like Pendleton, discussed 
in more detail infra, is nothing more than the manufacturing of facts not found credible 
by the trial court. For example, Wife claims that because she was living with Mr. 
Adams in the State of Florida for approximately two months and ten days, as the wife 
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did in Pendleton, where that court found no cohabitation, surely this Court should find 
likewise. Wife, however, once again fails to marshal the evidence as found by the trial 
court in support of her common residency with Mr. Adams, including the continuous 
nature of the relationship, the engagement of marriage between the parties, and the 
most compelling factor distinguishing Wife's case from every other cohabitation case 
in Utah, that she maintained no separate residence. See SOF, ^ 15. Wife in fact 
packed up her belongings and her five children, withdrew them from school in Utah, 
and in fact sent one child ahead with Mr. Adams and permitted and supported Mr. 
Adams to perform the fatherly task of enrolling her child in school in Florida. 
Conveniently, and in direct violation of the plethora of cases from this Court 
mandating the appellant's marshaling task, she utterly failed to bring these facts, in 
support of the trial court's findings, to the Court's attention. Clearly, Wife has not met 
her burden to marshal the evidence on appeal. She did not play "devil's advocate" 
and in fact she indefatigably continues to cling to her trial testimony, which if the trial 
court were to have accepted as true, would have had to disregard not only the truthful 
testimony of her ex-fiance Mr. Adams, but also her own witnesses, her children, and 
her self-proclaimed best friend and confidant Jaylynn Cobbley. 
Wife's failure to marshal the evidence provides a sufficient basis in and of itself 
to deny her appeal. However, the evidence relied on by the trial court in support of 
its findings and conclusion on cohabitation absolutely conform to Utah law, justify no 
other result, and sounds the death knell of her appeal. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND AND CONCLUDED 
THAT WIFE COHABITED WITH HER THEN FIANCE MR. ADAMS 
FROM APPROXIMATELY SEPTEMBER 1998 
THROUGH NOVEMBER 1998. 
This case more clearly than any other in the Utah case analogs, illustrates the 
intended application of the cohabitation statue, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9), which 
results in the termination of alimony. Wife's attempt to spin the facts otherwise does 
nothing more than reveal the incredibility and inconsistency of her evidence presented 
to the trial court. As such, the trial court correctly determined that Wife cohabited 
within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, the trial court terminated alimony as 
of November 1998. Under the state of the evidence, the trial court could not have 
found otherwise. 
Contrary to the position argued in Wife's brief, "cohabitation" as applied to the 
termination of alimony has not been clearly defined either in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(9) or applicable case law. See Wife's Brief, p. 8. Admittedly, the Code is clear that, 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the 
former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2000). Moreover, the Court in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 
P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985) did set forth a two part test for cohabitation under Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9): (1) common residency and (2) sexual contact.4 The Haddow 
Court was equally clear that once residency is established, alimony automatically 
4
 The Haddow Court defined "common residency" as, "the sharing of a common abode that both 
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time[;]" and "sexual 
contact" as, "participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing 
between husband and wife." Id. at 672. 
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terminates unless the cohabitating spouse can show the relationship is "without sexual 
contact." Id. at 672. 
The complexity and fact-intensive nature of the cohabitation determination 
under the Haddow test is illustrated through an amalgamation of Utah cases that set 
forth various considerations to determine whether a person has cohabited within the 
meaning of the statute. The weight and consideration given to each factor in a 
particular case serves to illustrate that each case is factually distinctive. 
In Haddow, the Court determined the applicability of the cohabitation statute 
to a term in the divorce decree ordering the wife to pay the husband his interest in their 
home, which she remained in possession of pursuant to the decree of divorce, upon, 
inter alia, her cohabitation. See Haddow, 707 P. 2d at 671. There the Court found 
cohabitation did not occur even though the testimony elicited at trial established that 
wife's boyfriend spent most of his free time with her; ate dinner at her home often; 
stayed at wife's home until late frequently during the week and then returned in the 
morning for coffee; stayed the night at wife's home approximately once a week; kept 
a few toiletries and clothes at wife's house and she sometimes did his laundry and took 
his clothes to the dry cleaners; sometimes showered and changed at wife's house 
before dinner; received mail for a couple of bank accounts at wife's house. See id. at 
670-71,673. 
However, the determinative factor and the critical circumstance that 
distinguishes Haddow from the instant case is that the wife's boyfriend maintained a 
separate residence from the wife, and the boyfriend spent no time at the home when 
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the wife was absent and did not have a key to the house. See id. at 673-74. The Court 
rationalized that "a resident will come and go as he pleases in his own home, while a 
visitor, however regular and frequent, will schedule his visits to coincide with the 
presence of the person he is visiting." Id. at 673. 
In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P. 2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), this Court 
reversed the trial court for its failure to find cohabitation under the particular facts of 
that case. See id. at 161. Specifically, Pendleton relied and elaborated on Haddow, 
explaining, "[common residency] implies continuity, not simply a habit of visiting or 
a sojourn." Id. at 1605. The Pendleton court also illustrated the case-by-case nature 
of a cohabitation determination. "Although neither the presence of portable 
possessions nor the sharing of living expenses is dispositive, either my nonetheless be 
indicative of maintaining a shared household and be regarded as some evidence of 
residency." Id. at 160-61 (citing Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P. 2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995)). The court also stated, "[w]hile it is true that [the boyfriend] did not assist in 
any way with the cost of maintaining [wife] 's home, the sharing of living expenses is 
not required to show residency in this context." Id. (citing Haddow). 
The "largely undisputed" facts in Pendleton establishing cohabitation included: 
wife's boyfriend stayed with her ninety percent of the time when he was not traveling 
with his job; he had his own key to wife's home; he came and went from wife's home 
even when she was not there; and the boyfriend had no other residence until the day 
5
 Citing Haddow, 707 P. 2d at 672. 
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before wife's husband filed the petition to terminate alimony6. See Pendleton, 918 P. 
2d at 161. 
The facts of the instant case fit squarely within this Court's analysis of the 
cohabitation statute in the case of Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P. 2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), a case Wife conveniently fails to cite to this Court. There, the Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of cohabitation where, 
On February 7,1993,... [wife] moved to Boulder, Colorado, where she stayed 
with [her boyfriend] at his condominium for two weeks before obtaining a 
second condominium [in the same complex] of her own nearby. The trial court 
found that, over the next few months, Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes 'lived together 
as though they were husband and wife' - and that they had sexual intercourse, 
shared living expenses, had open access to the other's condominium, ate 
together, maintained clothing in the same condominium, and used the same 
furniture. 
Id. at 910-11, 917-18.7 Relying on Haddow, this Court affirmed the trial court's 
finding that wife and her boyfriend "' in effect resided together,' even though they had 
separate condominiums in the same condominium complex." Id. at 917-18. (emphasis 
added). The additional factors, important to the trial court and which this Court based 
its affirmance on included: the couple had a sexual relationship; shared living 
expenses; enjoyed unrestricted access to each others' condominiums; ate meals 
together and shared food expenses; kept their clothes in the same condominium; used 
6
 The court opined that wife's boyfriend likely rented an apartment knowing of the impending 
petition and therefore, questioned the "genuineness" of the rental and discounted the significance of the 
rented apartment. See id at 161 n2. 
7
 The wife in Sigg maintained that she maintained a separate residence, shared few expenses with 
her boyfriend, and the two did not keep clothes in each others' condominiums. She did admit that her 
boyfriend had open access to her condominium, they visited frequently and did have intercourse. See id 
at911n4. 
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the same furniture; and "otherwise lived as though they were husband and wife." See 
id. at 918. 
Wife hangs her hat on Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P. 2d 1387 (Utah 1980). See 
Wife's Brief, pp. 9-10,13-14. The fatal flaw in her analysis and argument lies in the 
Utah Supreme Court's explicit holding in Bair v. Bair8, that Knuteson is the exception 
and not the rule. See Bair, 737 P. 2d at 179. The Bair Court explained the 
"exceptional circumstances" of Knuteson that justified a departure from the intent of 
the cohabitation statute which is "to prevent injustice to a spouse who frequently pays 
through the nose, so to speak, to an undeserving ex-mate."9 In addition to the fact that 
the wife's desperate circumstances in Knuteson were occasioned solely due to the 
husband's failure to pay alimony,10 
that the marital termination agreement eliminated some of [wife] 's demands in 
exchange for $7,000 in spousal support payments; that this amount was to be 
paid in installments; that the payments were characterized as alimony to give 
defendant tax spousal support payments; and finally, that [husband] knew about 
[wife]'s alliance with another man prior to entering into the agreement. 
Id. at 179. Not a single exceptional circumstance in Knuteson exists in the instant 
case. 
8
 737 P. 2d 177, 179 (Utah 1987)(fmding cohabitation provisions of the Title 30 did not apply to 
that case because the monies at issue should have properly been characterized as property settlement not 
alimony)(opinion by C.J. Howell, Asso. C.J. Stewart, Justices Howe, Durham, and Zimmerman concur). 
9
 Knuteson, 619 ?. 2d at 1389. 
10
 Knuteson, 619 P. 2d 1389 (explaining alimony termination statute does not apply to situation 
occasioned by husband's failure to pay "nor does the statute seem to apply to an indiscretion invited by a 
temporary emergency situation occasioned by unlivable conditions that is apt to happen for example as 
might be the case in a bomb shelter or in a home to which one may have ben removed in a dangerous area 
evacuation operation"). See id. 
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Furthermore, in Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P. 2d 533 (Utah 1983), another case 
Wife fails to candidly cite in her brief, the Utah Supreme Court further explained and 
distinguished Knuteson and illustrated the Court's intended meaning of "common 
residency" under the alimony termination statute. The Court first noted that alimony 
is automatically terminated once residence with another is established "unless the 
person receiving alimony can show that the relationship is 'without sexual contact.'" 
Id. at 534. The Court then went on to explicate the highly unusual circumstances of 
Knuteson which the Bair Court later affirmed, 1) that the wife in that case was 
"driven" to live with her neighbor due solely to husband's non-payment of alimony; 
and 2) the woman, who maintained and spent the majority of her time, at her separate 
residence, did not establish a common residence with the neighbor. See id. 
More recently, this Court in Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868-69 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), that Court found the two-part test set forth in Haddow and its progeny and the 
definitions of "residing with" and "sexual contact," applicable to a determination of 
whether a payor spouse's alimony obligation should terminate where a payee spouse 
is found to cohabitate with another individual.'' In Hill, this Court specifically found, 
"[w]e divine no legislative intent to abrogate the case law defining cohabitation in the 
alimony-termination context." Id. at 868 (deciding definitional issue of cohabitation 
in alimony termination context, where appellant argued the definition of cohabitation 
11
 The 1995 amendment deleted subsection (6) and added (9) as it currently appears, 
[a]ny order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2000). 
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in the Cohabitant Abuse Act should apply). Notably, in Hill, this Court recognized the 
Supreme Court's admonition that, '"[t]o some extent, the meaning of the term 
[cohabitation] depends upon the context in which it is used.'" Id. {quoting Haddow, 
707 P. 2d at 671). It follows, whether cohabitation has occurred such that alimony 
termination is warranted is also highly dependent upon the context and facts of each 
particular case. 
In the instant case, the facts supporting cohabitation are similar if not more 
compelling than in the Sigg case. Wife moved, with her five children, to Florida in 
September 1998 with the intention to live with her fiance Mr. Adams. See SOF, {^14. 
The family resided with Mr. Adams in Florida until Thanksgiving Day 1998, when 
Wife returned to Utah with her children. See SOF, f 17. At no time while Wife and her 
family lived in Florida did she have any residence other than that of Mr. Adams. See 
SOF, | t 17,52. To suggest at trial, to avoid the early termination of alimony, that she 
was nothing more than "friends" with a man to whom she was engaged, that she 
ceased having intercourse with him after her divorce when she engaged in frequent 
and ongoing sexual intercourse with him while she was married, that she did not hold 
his hand or kiss him or have any intimate contact with him at all flies in the face of 
Mr. Adams' testimony, the testimony of her own son Derrick Dibble and common 
sense. See SOF, TfJ 3-47. Such a claim or series of claims defies logic, the Record and 
is nothing short of ludicrous and is indeed, absurd. 
Additionally, Wife cannot claim she was "driven" to live with Mr. Adams, in 
as much as she was receiving over $6,000 monthly in tax free alimony and child 
34 
support, and it is undisputed that while in Florida living with Mr. Adams, he covered 
all of the family's living expenses as he understood he and Wife were to be married. 
SeeSOF^lS. 
Further, and perhaps most telling of the rationale behind the trial court's 
determination that Wife' s testimony at trial was totally unbelievable and without merit 
is the following: Wife took the stand in the morning on the first day of trial March 21, 
2001. R. 515: 24 (vol. I). At no time during her testimony, on direct examination or 
on cross-examination, did she once mention any physical abuse by Mr. Adams, or that 
she personally attempted to and did in fact obtain housing in Utah in October of 1998 
when she accompanied the children to Utah for Husband's wedding to his new wife. 
See SOF,^ 41. 
Following Wife's testimony, Husband called Mr. Adams to the stand and he 
testified to his and Wife's extensive sexual relations from the day they first met. See 
SOF, fflf 3-30. Wife's counsel did not question any witness as to any alleged physical 
abuse of Wife, as none existed. See SOF, ^ 42. Following Mr. Adams' testimony, 
Wife, not Husband, called the parties' son Derrick Dibble to testify to the relationship 
between Wife and Mr. Adams while living in Florida. See SOF, ff 36-37. On 
Husband's cross-examination, Derrick Dibble testified, in direct contradiction to his 
mother's testimony, that not only did his mother and Mr. Adams hold hands, but he 
is sure he observed them kissing, and had no idea whether they were sleeping together, 
because "tried to stay out of that stuff." See SOF, fflj 36-37. 
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Suddenly, and after a recess over lunch, Wife testified to a controlling and 
verbally and physically abusive relationship with Mr. Adams. See SOF, f 41. 
Suddenly, Wife is found testifying that in October of 1998 when she accompanied her 
children to Utah for their father's wedding, she sought and obtained housing in Utah 
because of the alleged abuse. See SOF, ^ 41. On cross-examination, however, Wife 
changed her story yet again, and testified that the alleged physical abuse did not start 
until she returned to Florida after the October 1998 wedding. See SOF, ^ 41. Her 
attempts to change the focus of her earlier testimony and that of every witness who 
testified, while convenient, simply did not carry the day and will not pass muster. 
Wife cohabited with Mr. Adams and no other conclusion, based upon the evidence, 
could be reached. In all candor, a clearer case of cohabitation could not be conceived. 
CONCLUSION 
Wife should not be allowed to engage in cohabitation, while continuing to 
punish Husband through his payment of alimony. Wife, through her cohabitation with 
Mr. Adams effectively enjoyed the support of two "husbands" while pocketing over 
$6,000 tax free, $ 13,000 in just two and one-half months. Utah's cohabitation statute, 
as related to alimony, was expressly promulgated to thwart this kind of disingenuous 
act. This Court should deny Wife's appeal and reaffirm not only the sound public 
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policy behind the cohabitation statute but the considered decision of the trial court. 
Husband should be awarded his attorneys fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
Dated this ^ ^ a y o f July 2002. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS &JSWENSON 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
T. MICKELL JIMENEZ ROWE 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
Carlos M. Dibble, M.D. 
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